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ON BEING I N  THE M I ND 
by 
Roderick Firth 
tr I am to respond in a fruitful way to Professor Shaffer's paper I must limit 
myself to a few specific topics. In the space at my disposal even these few topics 
can be treated only in a sketchy way. But I should like to say at the outset that I am 
in gt>ncral agreement with Shaffer's basic argument in favor of the dualist position 
that mental events (as Shaffer Ulses this term) are not identical with physical events. 
in the brain. Brain events, he says. occur only in a particular spatial location inside 
the head, but it is "nonsensical to say that mental events occur in any particular 
loca1io11.'' This seems to me to be the basic reason, ultimately the only reason, for 
preferring a lawful parallelism to the Identity Theory 1J we decide that that is where 
the issue lies. The issue between these two positions is consequently not a "ery 
important one. 
Philosophers who defend the Identity Theory often try to cons1rue 1he mind­
bod} problem in a way 1hat allows them 10 a'oid saying, in so many words, that 
mental e\ents (e.g . a sudden thought or a feeling of d1u.ine s) have a spatial 
location \\ tthin the body. One way to do 1his is 10 construe mental e\ents and 
ccnam physical e'en ts as states or propenies of something called a "subject," a 
··person." an "organism.'' etc. A philosopher may maintain, for example, that to say 
that the organism (person. subject) Smith has a thought is to attribute to Smith the 
state or property called "having a thought." And to say that a certain correlated 
physical event E is occurring within Smith's brain is to attribute to the same 
orgnnil>m a property to be called. perhaps, "having a brain within which E is oc­
curring." Then the Identity Theory is formulated as the theory that these two 
properties ure identical, or the theory that the event that consists in Smith's having 
th<: one property is identical with the event that consists in Smith's having the other. 
(Metaphysical decisions about the use of terms like 'event.' 'property,' 'state of 
affairs.' etc .. can generate a variety of formulations.) As John Austin said in another 
context, however, the frog is still there smiling up at us from the bottom of the mug. 
For there are ome events. like my having a thought, in which it is logically possible 
for me ( 'O to speak) to participate whether or not any physical object exists. As 
Descartes argue.'\, it would be Logically consistent for me to believe that I have a 
thought while I believe that I have no body. And there are other events, like my 
ha' ing a particular brain state, in which it is not logically possible for me to par-
11c1pat� unlcs-; at least one physical object exists. Thus we may ask: Is it meaningful 
to ,ay that an e'enl that can (logically) occur in the absence of all physical things 
(hence of physical space itself, on some accounts) is identical with an event that 
cannol (logically) occur in lbe absence of a physical object? Does our concept of 
contingent (empirical) 1denrity permit us to say such a thing? Do our criteria of 
contingent identmty extend to such a relationship? The answer. I think. is clearly No 
- though I confess that I would not know how to prove this to someone who 
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disagreed after careful reflection. I could only urge him not to let the fact that an 
organism (person. subject) can have both mental and physical properties obscure 
the basic conceptual distinction between these two kinds of properties, and the 
corresponding distinction between the two kinds of events in which the organism 
may participate. If it is not meaningful to say "My thoughts are located within six 
inches of my nose," any alternative terminology, unless it is question-begging, will 
allow us to find the same frog at the bottom of the mug. We could of course learn to 
use the word 'identical' in a new way to express a different concept. But this is an 
irrelevant and uninteresting fact. 
I think that Shaffer's second argument, "tlhe argument from privileged access," 
cannot be construed as a completely independent argument against the Identity 
Theory. For if a philosopher is prepared to identify mental events with brain events 
on the ground that they are lawfully related in certain ways, he need not hesitate to 
admit that we have some kind of "privileged access" to mental events. It is this 
epistemic fact, he might even say, that makes it possible to d iscover the !Psycho­
physical laws from wruch we can infer the contingent identity of mind and matter; 
for unless we had this privileged access lo particular mental events we should have 
uo evidence for the correlations that we need to establish the psycho-physical laws. 
Thus t'he crucial question is still the one discussed earlier: Do our crirteria of 
contingent identity permit us to infer the identity of mental and physical events 
from the fact that they are lawfully related in certain ways? The argument from 
privileged access is relevant to the mind-body problem to the extent that it bears on 
this question. It is useful as a way of dramatizing the conceptual difference between 
mental events and physical events that makes it meaningless (as Shaffer aud I 
maintain) to assert that mental events are located in space. I think that Shaffe;'s 
moral argument is useful for the same purpose. 
I should like to suggest, however, that Shaffer has not identified the special 
epistemic status of mental events in the best possible way. If someone believes 
firmly, Shaffer says. that he himself has a mental event (e.g. a feeling of paiin) then 
he cannot be mistaken in that belief. But is this so? Suppose, for example, that your 
dentist has told you to let him know as soon as you feel the slightest pain. You are 
strongly motivated to report the very first twinge of pain, but you do not want to 
sound a false alarm. As the drill buzzes its way deeper and deeper you are inclined 
at times to think that you feel pain. But each time you subsequently decide that you 
were mistaken. In this situation it might be quite natural to say to yourself at some 
point: "Now I really think I feel a slight pain but of course I may be mistaken." 
Although you believe that you are in pain you expressly concede, conltrary to 
Shaffer's thesis, that you may be mistaken. Can Shaffer show that this concession is 
irrational? I do not think so. 
Shaffer might perhaps object that I have not provided an example of someone 
believing /irm/y that he has a certain mental event. For under the circumstances, he 
might argue, anyone who concedes that he may be mistaken is thereby demon· 
strating that he does not believe firmly. But there is danger of circularity here. We 
must be careful not to define a firm belief about our own mental events as a belief 
that we think cannot be mistaken. For in that case we rule out by fiat every example 
that could be used to show that Shaffer's thesis is false. It is hard, furthermore, to 
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accept the doctrine that the mere strength of a belief about one's own experience 
can in general insure that the belief is true. It suggests, in line with what Hamlet 
said about right and wrong, that thinking with firm conviction that we are in pain 
always makes it so. Perhaps thinking that one is in pain can sometimes make it so. 
This may explain certain psycho-somatic illnesses and the efficacy of certain forms 
of ' oodoo. But such an argument cannot be extended to yield a guarantee that all 
firm bdiefs about our own mental events are similarly "self-fulfilling." 
1 think, therefore, that our "privileged access" to mental events consists not in a 
guarantee of true belief but in a guarantee of self-warranted belief. If I believe that 
J feel pain then l am to some extent justified in believing that J feel pain. My belief 
has some degree of warrant quite independently of any reasons or evidence that I 
might have for thinking that I am in pain. In fact 1 might have many good reasons 
for thinking that I should not be feeling pain at the moment; but if 1 nevertheless 
believe that I am feeling pain my belief may be warranted despite the contrary 
evidence. Beliefs about objects in physical space, on the other hand, are never self· 
warranted in this -;ense. Al this moment, for example. I am justified in thinking that 
J see a sheet of white paper before me. But I can account fully for this justification 
by appealing to the shape and the texture of the object before me and to the various 
visual and tactual sense-experiences that I am now ha"ing. Thus the things to which 
we ha'e a pri,ilegcd epistemic access are precisely those mental events that can 
(logically) ei1:ist in the absence of objects in physical space. 
In conclusion I shall comment 'cry briefly on 1he issue between the Bundle 
Theory and 1he Mental Substance Theory as SbaHer uses those terms. The Bundle 
Theory i-; doomed. I think, by the fact that it is logically possible that there should 
be l\\O people with exactly similar mental events 1hroughout their existence. 
�omewherc 1n history, for all we know, there may actually have been two babies, 
each living \'Cry brierly. who experienced exactly similar feelings of hunger, 
warmth. and pain, and then died. Yet they were two babies with two minds, not two 
hodies with but a single mind. The advancage of the Mental Substance Theory over 
the Bundle Theory is that it allows us to recognize this possibility. It allows us to say 
that the difference between two such bundles of mental events, iI they should exist, 
wuul<l lie in the fact that the experiences "belong to" two irreducibly different 
things - two minds or souls or egos or mental substances that are not in any way 
definable in termci of the experiences themselves. As a matter of fact this is the only 
ad, antage of the Mental Substance Theory. Menial substance is not needed, for 
example, ao; a c:a11sal agent. for the causation of mental events could surely be 
accounted for, if we knew enough, by appealing to causal laws that link mental 
C\Cnts c11her with phy ical C\Cnts or with other mental events. 
To separate the Mental Substance Theory Crom superfluous historical 
associations. what we need, I think, is some easy and natural way of thinking and 
talking about "bundles" of mental events in a way that allows similar bundles to be 
differentiated. For this purpose I suggest that we take seriously the expression 'in 
lhe mind.' We say things like these: "It's hard to know what goes on in her mind.'' "I 
shall try to keep that in mind." "I've decided to put that thought out of mind until 
tomorrow." And so on. We use an analogous temporal idiom to locate objects and 
event'I in relation to the present. We say "Those unhappy events arc all in the past. 
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thank God!" "He is loo old to adjust to what is happening in che present." "When 
things like this happen in the future we shall be better prepared for them." "Every 
event is either in the past, the present. or the future." And so on. 
The two idioms raise similar problems and suggest similar philosophical 
positions. A philosopher of Humean temperament, for example, might propose a 
"bundle theory of tense" to explain the terms 'past.' 'present.' and 'future.' He might 
argue that none of these terms designates an empirical property that distinguishes 
each event of one kind (e.g., each past event) from events of the other two kinds. 
We can only define the past, the present. and the future in relation to one another, 
which gets us nowhere. Therefore, our new Hume might maintain, the past, the 
present. and the future can only be thought of as chree bundles of events, 
distinguished only by the fact that there are different events in each bundle. But of 
course such a bundle theory of tense will not work. The contents of the bundles 
keep changing as future events become present events and present events become 
past events, and we are left with the question: What do the new past events have in 
common with the old? 
After considering this analogy, it may still remain a mysterious fact, at least a 
wondrous fact, that being in a particular mind is enough to distinguish a bundle of 
mental events from a similar bundle in another mind. It is no less wondrous, 
however, that being in the present is enough. independently of reference to clocks 
and calendars, to distinguish a bundle of present events from a similar bundle that 
may have occurred in the past or that may occur in the future. In both cases the 
distinction is one of location within what might be called a "range of existence." If 
something has happened in the past it exists in a certain range of existence, namely, 
the past. U some feeling occurs in my mind it exists in a certain range of existence, 
nametiy, my mind. If a similar feeling occurs in your mind, it occurs in another 
range of existence, namely, your mjnd. It may be thac to say this is not to explain 
anything. But philosophy begins in wonder, and sometimes we find a degree of 
contentment when we see that there are other things no less wondrous than the 
object of our wonder. 
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